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Abstract
We visualize aggregate outputs of popular multiwinner voting rules—SNTV, STV, Bloc, k-
Borda, Monroe, Chamberlin–Courant, and HarmonicBorda—for elections generated according
to the two-dimensional Euclidean model. We consider three applications of multiwinner voting,
namely, parliamentary elections, portfolio/movie selection, and shortlisting, and use our results
to understand which of our rules seem to be best suited for each application. In particular,
we show that STV (one of the few nontrivial rules used in real high-stake elections) exhibits
excellent performance, whereas the Bloc rule (also often used in practice) performs poorly.
1 Introduction
The goal of this paper is to develop a better understanding of a number of well-known multiwin-
ner voting rules, by analyzing their behavior in elections where voters’ preferences are generated
according to a two-dimensional spatial model. By focusing on this preference domain, we can vi-
sualize the election results and check if they agree with the intuition and motivation behind these
rules. Our study can be seen as an experimental counterpart of the work of of Elkind et al. [7], who
analyze multiwinner rules axiomatically.
In a multiwinner election, the goal is to select a size-k committee (i.e., a set of k candidates,
where k ∈ N is part of the input) based on the voters’ preferences. Usually, voters can express
∗This paper has originally appeared in proceedings of the AAAI-2017 conference. The current version includes addi-
tional material in the appendix, a correction of a bug (in the AAAI paper we claimed results for the αk-PAV rule, while
in fact they were for the HarmonicBorda rule; this is corrected in this manuscript), and minor updates to the references.
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their preferences by listing the candidates from best to worst or by indicating which candidates they
approve; we focus on the former setting, as it fits the spatial preference model better.
Applications of multiwinner voting range from choosing a parliament through preparing a
portfolio of company’s products [18, 19] or choosing movies to offer to passengers on a long
flight [7, 22] to shortlisting runners-up for an award [2, 7]. As a consequence, there is also quite
a variety of different multiwinner voting rules. For instance, for parliamentary elections an impor-
tant desideratum is proportional representation of the voters, and there are voting rules such as
STV or the Monroe rule (we define all the rules considered in this paper in the next section) that
have been designed with this idea in mind. On the other hand, in the context of portfolio or movie
selection we primarily care about the diversity of the selected committee, and it has been argued
that the Chamberlin–Courant rule is good for this purpose [18, 22]. For shortlisting, our primary
concern is fairness: if there are two similar candidates, we want to select both or neither, and in-
creasing the target committee size should not result in any of the selected candidates being dropped;
these requirements are satisfied by k-Borda. Naturally, there are other scenarios which require other
normative properties.
The examples above indicate that choosing a good multiwinner rule is not a trivial task. It is
therefore natural to ask how we can facilitate the decision-making process of a user who is facing
this choice. There are several good answers to this question. First, some rules are specifically de-
signed for certain tasks. For example, STV and the Monroe rule have explicit built-in mechanisms
ensuring that every sufficiently large group of like-minded voters is represented. Second, we can an-
alyze axiomatic properties of the rules. This line of work, was extensively pursued for single-winner
rules; for the case of multiple winners in was initiated by Felsenthal and Maoz [14] and Debord [5],
with recent contributions including the work of Elkind et al. [7] and Aziz et al. [1]. Finally, one can
use empirical analysis to compare different rules under particular conditions. For example, Diss and
Doghmi [6] consider a few multiwinner voting rules and experimentally investigate how frequently
they pick Condorcet committees.1 All these approaches are useful, and the choice of a voting rule
should take all of them into account.
Nonetheless, a non-expert user may still feel ill at ease when deciding which rule to choose for
his or her particular application. In this case, a picture may be worth a thousand words: a simple
graph that clearly explains differences between rules can be very informative. The contribution of
this paper is to propose a novel approach to selecting a suitable mutiwinner rule, which is based
on graphical information. That is, we provide images that we expect to be helpful in discussions
of multiwinner voting rules. Naturally, reality is too complicated for a single picture to constitute
a definite argument, but we believe that, on the one hand, our results provide good illustrations
confirming intuitions regarding various multiwinner rules and, on the other hand, they highlight
some faults of the rules that otherwise would not be easily visible.
Our Methodology. The outcome of an election depends both on the voting rule and on the set
of candidates. In this work, we focus on the former aspect and ask what multiwinner rules do
when choosing from a set of candidates that is representative of the electorate, i.e., under what one
may call the representative candidacy assumption. We evaluate a number of multiwinner voting
1In a Condorcet committee, every committee member is preferred to every non-member by a majority of the voters.
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STV k-Borda
Figure 1: Results of an election (generated using the 2D Euclidean model) according to STV (left)
and k-Borda (right). Voters are depicted as dark gray dots, candidates as light gray dots, and the
winners as larger blue dots.
rules (SNTV, STV, Bloc, k-Borda, Chamberlin–Courant, Monroe, and HarmonicBorda) on elections
generated using the two-dimensional Euclidean model of preferences. In this model each candidate
and each voter is represented by a point on a plane, and voters form their preference orders by
ranking the candidates that are closer to them above the ones that are further away.
This model is very appealing and extensively studied [9, 10] because of its natural interpreta-
tions: A point representing a candidate or a voter simply specifies his or her position regarding two
given issues. In the world of politics, these two issues could be, for example, the preferred levels of
taxation and immigration, or the extent to which the individual believes in personal and economic
freedom. While in some settings more dimensions may be necessary, the popularity of the Nolan
Chart, which is used to represent the spectrum of political opinions, indicates that two dimensions
are often sufficient to provide a good approximation of voters’ preferences.
In Figure 1 we show a sample election (the points for candidates and voters are generated using
uniform distribution over a square) and the committees selected by STV (left) and k-Borda (right).
It is quite evident that the committee on the left would form a far more representative parliament
than the one on the right, whereas the one on the right would probably be a better choice for the
set of candidates that are shortlisted for a position, since they are similar to each other and receive
broad support among the voters (in particular, no voter ranks them close to the bottom of their list).
Our main contributions are as follows:
1. For each of our voting rules and four distributions of candidates and voters (Gaussian, uniform
on a disc, uniform on a square, and a mix of four Gaussians), we have generated 10 000
elections and built histograms (Figure 3) indicating how likely it is that a candidate from a
given position will be selected.
2. We consider three applications of multiwinner voting, and, for each application, we identify
the voting rules in our collection that are most appropriate for it. We make these recommen-
dations based on our histograms and certain statistical properties of the elected committees.
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E.g., we confirm that STV is an excellent rule for parliamentary elections, even superior to the
Monroe rule; HarmonicBorda can also be seen as an interesting rule that chooses fairly repre-
sentative committees, ignoring candidates with extreme opinions. We also provide evidence
that Bloc should be treated very carefully since it may not perform as well as one might expect
(this is particularly important because Bloc is among the most popular multiwinner rules).
We present some of our results in the appendix (in particular, this is the case for the analysis of
approximation algorithms for the Monroe and Chamberlin–Courant rules).
2 Preliminaries
For every positive integer n, we write [n] to denote the set {1, . . . , n}.
Elections. An election E = (C, V ) consists of a set C = {c1, . . . , cm} of candidates and a list
V = (v1, . . . , vn) of voters. Each voter vi has a preference orderi, i.e., a ranking of the candidates
from the most to the least favored one (according to this voter). For a voter v and a candidate c, we
write posv(c) to denote the position of c in v’s preference order (where the top-ranked candidate
has position 1). A committee is a subset of C.
A multiwinner voting rule is a function R that, given an election E = (C, V ) and a target
committee size k (1 ≤ k ≤ |C|), outputs a nonempty set of size-k committees; these committees
are said to tie as election winners. In practice, one has to use some tie-breaking mechanism. For our
experiments, whenever we need to break a tie (possibly at an intermediate stage in the execution of
the rule), we make a random choice with a uniform distribution over all possibilities.
(Single-Winner) Scoring Functions. For an election with m candidates, a scoring function γm
associates each position j, j ∈ [m], with a score γm(j). The γm-score that candidate c receives
from voter v is γm(posv(c)). The γm-score of candidate c in election E is the sum of the γm-scores
that c receives from the voters in E. We consider the following two prominent families of scoring
functions:
1. The Borda scoring function, βm, is defined as βm(j) = m− j.
2. For each t ∈ [m], the t-Approval scoring function, αt, is defined as αt(j) = 1 if j ≤ t and
αt(j) = 0 otherwise. The candidate’s 1-Approval score is known as her Plurality score.
Multiwinner Rules. We focus on the following multiwinner rules (in the description below we
consider an election E = (C, V ), with m candidates and n voters, and committee size k):
SNTV. The Single Nontransferable Vote rule (SNTV) outputs k candidates with the highest Plural-
ity scores.
STV. The Single Transferable Vote rule (STV) executes a series of iterations, until it finds k win-
ners. A single iteration operates as follows: If there is at least one candidate with Plurality
score at least q = b nk+1c+ 1, then a candidate with the highest Plurality score is added to the
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committee; then q voters that rank him or her first are removed from the election (our random-
ized tie-breaking plays an important role here), and the selected candidate is removed from
all voters’ preference orders. If there is no such candidate, then a candidate with the lowest
Plurality score is removed from the election (again, ties are broken uniformly at random). The
Plurality scores are then recomputed.
Bloc. Under the Bloc rule we output k candidates with the highest k-Approval scores (intuitively,
each voter is asked to name his or her k favorite committee members, and those mentioned
most frequently are elected).
k-Borda. Under the k-Borda rule we output k candidates with the highest Borda score.
β-CC. The (classical) Chamberlin–Courant rule (β-CC) is defined as follows [4]. A k-CC-assignment
function is a function Φ: V → C such that |Φ(V )| ≤ k (i.e., Φ associates each voter with a
candidate in a set W ⊆ C, |W | ≤ k; for a voter v, candidate Φ(v) is referred to as v’s repre-
sentative). The β-CC score of an assignment Φ is defined as β(Φ) =
∑
v∈V βm(posv(Φ(v)))
(i.e., it is the sum of the Borda scores of voters’ representatives). β-CC finds a k-CC-assignment
Φ that maximizes β(Φ) and outputs the committee Φ(V ) (if it happens that |Φ(V )| < k—a
situation that occurs, e.g., when all the voters have identical preference orders—then β-CC
supplements Φ(V ) with k − |Φ(V )| candidates selected at random).
β-Monroe. The (classical) Monroe rule [20] is similar to β-CC, except that it is restricted to k-
Monroe-assignments. A k-Monroe-assignment is a k-CC-assignment that satisfies the fol-
lowing constraints: (a) |Φ(V )| = k, and (b) for each candidate c such that Φ−1(c) 6= ∅ (i.e.,
for each selected representative) it holds that bnk c ≤ |Φ−1(c)| ≤ dnk e. Intuitively, under the
Monroe rule each selected candidate represents, roughly, the same number of voters.
HarmonicBorda (HB). The HarmonicBorda rule, introduced by Faliszewski et al. [11] but in-
spired by the PAV rule (see, e.g., the works of Kilgour [15], Aziz et al. [1], and Lackner and
Skowron [16] for detailed discussions of the PAV rule) operates as follows. For a voter v
and a committee W such that v ranks the members of W on positions p1 < · · · < pk, the
HarmonicBorda score that v assigns to W is HB(W, v) =
∑k
t=1
1
tβm(pt). For an election
E = (C, V ), the HB score of a committee W is defined as HB(W,V ) =
∑
v∈V HB(W, v).
The rule outputs a committee with the highest HB score.
With our tie-breaking, STV, SNTV, Bloc, and k-Borda are computable in polynomial time using
straightforward algorithms. Unfortunately, the Chamberlin–Courant and Monroe rules are NP-hard
to compute (Procaccia et al. [21] show this for variants of these rules that use t-Approval scores
αt instead of β; for the Borda-based variants defined here, the results for the Chamberlin–Courant
rule and the Monroe rule are due to Lu and Boutilier [18] and Betzler et al. [3], respectively). We
compute these rules by solving their integer linear programming (ILP) formulations (suggested by
Lu and Boutilier [18] for the case of Chamberlin–Courant, and by Skowron et al. [23] for the case
of Monroe). NP-hardness of the HB rule is folklore and we use a simplified version of the ILP
formulation proposed by Skowron et al. [22] to compute it (see the appendix for details).
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Euclidean Preferences. Given two points on the plane, p1 = (x1, y1) and p2 = (x2, y2), we
write d(p1, p2) to denote the distance
√
(x2 − x1)2 + (y2 − y1)2 between them.
In a two-dimensional Euclidean election E = (C, V ), each entity e (i.e., either a candidate or a
voter) is associated with a point p(e) = (x(e), y(e)). Given a pair of candidates ci, cj ∈ C, a voter
v ∈ V prefers ci to cj if d(p(v), p(ci)) < d(p(v), p(cj)). Note that this condition does not constrain
voter’s preferences over two equidistant candidates. In our case, since we draw our elections at
random, such situations are unlikely to happen. When they do, we break the tie arbitrarily.
Euclidean preferences are very useful to realistically model political preferences and, in many
cases, to model preferences in shortlisting tasks. Unfortunately, they are not nearly as useful for
modeling preferences over movies. The reason is that people often do not have a single most favorite
type of a movie, but rather like various genres for different reasons. Nonetheless, investigating rules
meant for the movie selection application (i.e., for selecting diverse committees) in our framework
is still important. On the one hand, movie selection is not the only application where diverse com-
mittees are needed, and, on the other hand, if a rule behaves badly on the Euclidean domain, then it
is unlikely that it would behave well for richer preference models.
3 Main Results and Analysis
Experimental Setup. We assume that both the candidates and the voters have ideal positions
in a two-dimensional Euclidean issue space that are drawn from the same distributions. For each
voting rule and each distribution, we generated 10 000 elections, each withm = 200 candidates and
n = 200 voters, and for each of them we computed a winning committee of size k = 20.
We consider four distributions of the ideal positions:
Gaussian. Ideal points are generated using symmetric Gaussian distribution with mean (0, 0) and
standard deviation 1.
Uniform Square. Ideal points are distributed uniformly on the square [−3, 3]× [−3, 3].
Uniform Disc. Ideal points are distributed uniformly on the disc with center (0, 0) and radius 3.
4-Gaussian. Ideal points are generated using four symmetric Gaussian distributions with standard
deviation 0.5, but different mean values, namely, (−1, 0), (1, 0), (0,−1) and (0, 1); each
mean is used to generate 25% of the points.
We use the Gaussian distribution to model a society with one dominant idea (e.g., where being
moderate is the most popular position, or where a single dominant party exists). Since the boundary
plays a significant role in the case of uniform distributions (we will discuss this effect below), we
have chosen the Gaussian distribution, as its density vanishes close to the boundary.
The 4-Gaussian distribution models a structured society, with four well-established positions
(for the movie selection scenario, these might correspond to, e.g., a combination of two genres and
two typical budget values; in the world of politics, these could be four political parties).
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We also use the uniform distributions, on a square and on a disc, as intermediate cases, and in
order to study specific behavior of voting rules at the border and, in case of the square, at the corners
of the support of the distribution.
Raw Results. For each rule and each distribution, we have computed a histogram, showing how
frequently winners from a given location were selected. These histograms, together with examples
of elections and their winning committees, are presented in Figure 3 (the first row presents the
distributions themselves).
The histograms were generated as follows. For each rule and distribution, all the winners were
always within the [−3, 3]×[−3, 3] square. We have partitioned this square into 120×120 cells (each
cell is a 0.05 × 0.05 square), and—for each given distribution and rule—counted how many times
a member of the winning committee fell into a given cell (we refer to this value as the frequency
of this cell). Then we have transformed the frequencies into color intensities (the more winners fall
into a particular cell, the darker it is in Figure 3). Since there are big differences among frequencies
of cells across various rules and distributions (e.g., the highest frequency of a cell for k-Borda with
the Gaussian distribution is over 27 times larger than the highest frequency of a cell for SNTV
under the uniform square distribution), we took the following approach. Given a cell of frequency
x, we compute its color intensity y (0 ≤ y ≤ 1; the closer is y to 1 the darker is the cell) using the
following formula:
y = 1pi/2 arctan
(
x
εT
)
, (1)
where T is the sum of the frequencies of all the cells (so in our case T = 20 · 10000) and ε is a
parameter. We used ε = 0.0004, so for the highest frequency of a cell in all our experiments (found
for k-Borda with the Gaussian distribution) we have x/(εT ) = 10.9; for most other rules and
distributions this value is below 1.5 and thus falls into the part where our function behaves fairly
linearly (see Figure 2). To present the distributions themselves, we computed histograms of the
ideal points generated using our distributions (on the technical side, to generate these histograms,
we used candidate positions from 10 000 generated elections for each distribution; since formula (1)
is normalized, the pictures in the first row of Figure 3 are comparable to those in the other rows).
 0
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Figure 2: Plot of the function y = 1pi/2 arctan
(
x
εT
)
that we use for converting cell frequencies to
color intensities.
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Figure 3: Histograms and sample elections for our rules and distributions. The first row shows the
distributions only. For sample election, voters are depicted as dark gray dots, candidates as light
gray dots, and the winners as larger blue dots.
Analysis. We now consider the three applications of multiwinner rules that we mentioned in the
introduction and analyze which of our rules are most suitable for each application.
Parliamentary Elections. We start with the case of parliamentary elections. Intuitively, in this
application we value proportional representation, which requires that the distribution of the winners
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rule square disc Gauss. 4 Gauss.
SNTV 3.292 3.219 3.275 2.787
STV 0.994 1.070 1.150 1.043
β-Monroe 0.738 0.797 0.864 0.765
β-CC 0.765 0.820 0.866 0.826
Bloc 17.789 17.146 18.709 9.663
HB 1.323 1.391 1.463 1.289
k-Borda 4.605 4.653 4.736 3.653
Table 1: Variance of the number of winners in each quadrant. Bold font indicates rules where this
value suggests asymmetric placement of winners on the plane (for k-Borda, this turns out to be a
false alarm).
(as seen through the histograms) should be as close as possible to the underlying distribution of
the voters. Thus, at first sight, among our rules SNTV would be the champion in this category. In
addition, SNTV satisfies a number of axioms studied by Elkind et al. [7], especially those geared
towards proportional representation. However, at the same time, it is intuitively clear that SNTV is
not a very good rule because it only takes the voters’ top choices into account, thus ignoring most
of the information in the voters’ preferences. A look at the sample elections for SNTV (Figure 3)
shows that this intuition is correct: The reason why SNTV has such an appealing histogram is that it
selects committee members in areas that, by random chance, have above-average density of voters
and below-average density of candidates. Over all 10 000 elections such areas are distributed evenly,
similarly to the distribution of the candidates and voters.
This means that, in addition to considering the histograms, we also need to check if results of
individual elections are close to what the histograms show. To this end we have used an indirect
approach that, nonetheless, turned out to be very effective. Let us fix some rule R and one of our
distributions. For each generated election, we (1) count how many members of the winning commit-
tee are in each of the four quadrants [0,±∞) × [0,±∞), (2) collect these numbers in a sequence,
and (3) compute the variance of this sequence; Table 1 shows the result of this computation, aver-
aged over all instances. Since all our distributions are symmetric with respect to the x and y axes, for
rules that represent voters proportionally in individual instances we expect this number to be small.
Of course, the converse claim need not be true: Low variance does not guarantee proportional rep-
resentation. That is, the variance-based approach can be used to eliminate ‘bad’ rules rather than to
identify ‘good’ rules.
Table 1 clearly identifies a group of rules for which the variance of the number of winners per
quadrant is close to or below 1.0, whereas for other rules the variance is significantly higher (in our
experiments, typically close to or above 3.0). Thus, the performance of SNTV (close to 3.0) is a
strong argument against it. On the other hand, the results for STV (both the shape of histograms
and the variance) indicate that it is an exceedingly good rule for selecting parliaments. Indeed, this
is the only rule with low variance that is computationally tractable. This is quite important, as STV
is among just a few nontrivial voting rules used in practice, yet some researchers—including some
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of us, until recently—consider it unappealing. The axiomatic results of Elkind et al. [7] and our
experiments provide different arguments in favor of using STV for proportional representation.
The results for β-Monroe are slightly less appealing than those for STV. While the variance of
the number of winners per quadrant is low, the histograms are farther from resembling the distri-
butions of candidates and voters. They are very similar to those for β-CC, which should not be too
surprising. In our experiments, the only difference between these rules is that β-Monroe is forced
to assign exactly 10 voters to each selected committee member, whereas β-CC can choose an opti-
mal assignment, where the number of voters assigned to each committee member may be arbitrary.
Nonetheless, for each of the distributions, around 80% of the committee members selected by β-CC
were assigned to between 7 and 13 voters each. In effect, the assignments computed by β-CC and
β-Monroe were quite similar. Naturally, if the distributions of candidates and voters were not identi-
cal, the results would be different as well (we have run initial experiments to confirm this, available
in the appendix). Below we discuss the intriguing patterns in the histograms for β-CC (a similar
explanation applies to β-Monroe).
Portfolio/Movie Selection. Let us now consider the portfolio/movie selection scenario [18, 19,
7, 22]. Here we care mostly about the diversity of the committee and, intuitively, we would like to
obtain histograms that cover a large chunk of the support of the distribution, but which—as com-
pared to the parliamentary elections setting—are less responsive to the densities of the candidates
and voters.
We first analyze the results for β-CC, a rule that seems to be designed exactly for this scenario.
However, it does not quite fit the description above. As we will see, to some extent this is due to
the nature of the rule, and to some extent this is because our initial expectations were not entirely
reasonable. There are two main issues regarding β-CC.
The first one concerns what we call the edge effect and the corner effect. Let us consider the
uniform square distribution. If a candidate is located far from the edges, then he or she is also
surrounded by a relatively large number of other candidates with whom he or she needs to compete
for a high position in the voters’ preference orders. On the other hand, if a candidate is located
near an edge (or, better yet, near a corner) then the competition is less stiff. However, if a candidate
is close to the edge/corner, the number of voters for whom he or she would be a representative
also decreases. In effect, for the uniform square and uniform disc distributions, we see increased
frequencies of winners near (but not exactly on) the edges and corners. The edge and corner effects
are visible also for SNTV and STV (though to a lesser extent), and they are very prominent for Bloc
(especially in conjunction with cases where an area near edge/corner has an above-average density
of voters).
The second issue regarding β-CC is that when some candidate is included in the committee,
other candidates that are very close to him or her are unlikely to be selected; indeed, this behavior
is quite desirable when one wants to maintain diversity of the committee. This explains why for
the uniform square and uniform disc distributions the near-edge area with increased frequencies
is surrounded by an area with lower frequencies. This effect also explains the interesting pattern
for the 4-Gaussian distribution. Since there are many voters in the centers of the four Gaussians,
candidates from these locations are likely to be included in the committee. But this very fact strongly
decreases the chances of the candidates that are located just a bit further away from the centers of
10
the Gaussians.
Our visual inspection of the election results for β-CC shows that every single committee appears
to be diverse and appealing for the portfolio/movie selection problem (this is also supported by the
low value of the variance of the number of winners per quadrant). However, the histograms show
that the rule also has an implicit, systematic bias against certain candidates (the nature of this bias
depends on the distribution) that users of the rule should take into account.
HarmonicBorda also appears to be a very interesting rule for the portfolio/movie selection task
(and, perhaps, even for parliamentary elections). In our experiments, HarmonicBorda chose com-
mittees distributed fairly uniformly in the central areas, ignoring candidates with extreme opinions.
Shortlisting. Here our guiding principle is that the committee should consist of similar candi-
dates (i.e., located close to each other). For this criterion, k-Borda is our rule of choice. In all of
the experiments it consistently chose candidates located in the center, close to each other. Table 1
indicates that k-Borda has high variance of the number of winners per quadrant. We believe that
this is caused not by any faults of the rule itself, but by a fairly natural statistical property of our
distributions. Since k-Borda selects 20 candidates from the center, due to random perturbations,
sometimes the central candidates are not distributed over the quadrants in a perfectly balanced way,
and our variance-based measure does not take into account the candidates’ centrality.
The Strange Case of Bloc. In the situation where k candidates are to be selected (e.g., to a city
council), it is quite common to ask the voters to come up with k names (ranked or non-ranked).
Bloc, in particular, is quite a popular rule. Our histograms show that Bloc is very sensitive to the
edge and corner effects (the pattern is similar to that for β-CC, but the effects are much stronger).
Worse yet, Table 1 shows very high variance of the number of winners in each quarter and, indeed,
the example elections for Bloc in Figure 3 show very asymmetric placements of the winners. These
two arguments by themselves make Bloc a questionable voting rule.
Bloc is also the only rule in our collection that shows the following inversion effect: For the
Gaussian distribution, the frequencies of the cells near the center (i.e., near the mean of the Gaus-
sian distribution) are lower than the frequencies of the cells in the ring surrounding it. This is a
very counter-intuitive and unexpected phenomenon: The most popular views in the society are rep-
resented less frequently than the not-so-popular ones. We believe that the mechanism behind this
effect is similar to that behind the edge/corner effect: Even though the center has the highest density
of the voters, it also has the highest density of the candidates, who therefore “steal points away” from
each other. As a consequence, the slightly less popular candidates in the ring get enough support
(both from some of the voters in the center and from those on the ring and beyond) to be elected.2
4 Robustness of the Results
So far we have considered elections with m = 200 candidates, m = 200 voters, and committee
size k = 20 only. Thus it is natural to wonder if our conclusions remain valid as we vary these
parameters.
2Indeed, this can be seen as a type of approximate cloning (see the discussion in the papers of of Tideman [24],
Laffond et al. [17], and Elkind et al. [8]).
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Figure 4: Histograms for our rules under the disc distribution, for committee sizes 10, 20, and 30.
For HarmonicBorda (k ∈ {10, 30}) and Monroe (k = 30) we computed only 5000 elections. Due
to technical issues, for β-Monroe with k = 10 we computed only about 500 elections.
Except for STV and β-Monroe, all our rules belong to the class of committee scoring rules [7,
12], i.e., they define a per-voter score of each possible committee and select committees for which
the sums of these scores are the highest. In consequence, the results for these rules should not change
significantly with the number of voters (unless this number becomes very small). Since STV and
β-Monroe are similar in spirit to committee scoring rules (indeed, STV is similar to SNTV and
β-Monroe is very closely related to β-CC), the results for them should be similarly robust.
We also do not expect strong qualitative differences in our results for different numbers of
candidates or different committee sizes (again, except for very small values). Nonetheless, we do
observe quantitative differences.
In Figure 4 we present histograms for our rules with respect to the disc distribution, for commit-
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tee sizes 10, 20, and 30 (the histogram for committee size 20 is the same as in Figure 3; we repeat
it for the sake of comparison). We note that the results for SNTV and STV are nearly the same irre-
spective of the committee size.3 The results for Bloc, HarmonicBorda, and k-Borda also look very
similar, and the differences are only in the radii of the discs/rings generated by these rules (this is
especially natural for k-Borda; as we choose more and more of the centrally located candidates, they
form a larger and larger disc). The results for β-CC and β-Monroe for different committee sizes also
look similar, but for k = 10 (especially for the case of β-CC) the artifacts in the histograms become
much more visible (e.g., for k = 10 and β-CC, there are two very clearly visible consecutive rings).
This indicates that our observations about β-CC and β-Monroe do not necessarily carry over to the
case of very small committees.
5 Conclusions
Our results lead to several interesting observations. Foremost, within the framework of our study
STV stands out as an exceptionally good rule for parliamentary elections. On the other hand, the
Monroe rule, which is also an appealing rule for this application, did not do quite as well. We also
found that the Monroe and Chamberlin–Courant rules may have (somewhat surprising) implicit
biases against some candidates. Further, we discovered that in our experiments HarmonicBorda
tends to ignore extremist candidates and fairly uniformly covers central areas (this seems quite
related to the results of Aziz et al. [1] on justified representation). We confirmed that k-Borda has
good properties as a shortlisting rule and provided strong arguments against the Bloc rule.
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A Overview
In this appendix we present the results omitted from the main part of the paper. First, we present
approximation algorithms for the Chamberlin–Courant and Monroe rules (including one that is due
to this paper) and discuss the results for them. Then we show our preliminary results for a scenario
where the distributions of candidates and voters are not similar. Finally, we show our Integer Linear
Program (ILP) formulation for HarmonicBorda.
B Approximation Algorithms
Let us first consider approximation algorithms for β-CC. Recall that if E = (C, V ) is an election, k
is a committee size, and Φ is a k-CC-assignment, then by β(Φ) we denote the sum of Borda scores
that the voters assign to their representatives (with respect to Φ). Given a committeeW and election
E, by the grab-your-best assignment of W to the voters in E we mean the function gyb(W,E)
which assigns to each voter the member of W which this voter ranks highest.
We consider the following three approximation algorithms for β-CC (we use the same notation
as in the description of our multiwinner rules; E = (C, V ) is the election at hand and k is the
committee size):
GreedyCC. The algorithm starts by setting the initial committee W to be empty, and then executes
the following k iterations: In each iteration, it extends the committee W with a candidate c
(previously not included inW ) that maximizes β(gyb(W∪{c})). (In particular, the algorithm
always starts by including the candidate with the highest Borda score.) Finally, it outputs the
computed committee W . GreedyCC is due to Lu and Boutilier [18] and guarantees approxi-
mation ratio of at least 1− 1e ≈ 0.63.
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Figure 5: Results for approximation algorithms for β-CC and β-Monroe.
Algorithm P. This algorithm proceeds as follows. First, it computes a threshold value x = |C|w(k)k
(where w(·) is Lambert’s w function; w(k) is o(log k)). Then it sets the initial committee W
to be empty and executes k iterations as follows: In each iteration, it finds a candidate c that
is ranked among the top x positions by the largest number of voters. Then it adds c to W and
deletes all the voters that rank c among their top x positions. (Thus, the algorithm can be seen
as an incarnation of a greedy SetCover algorithm, where voters are items to be covered and
each candidate covers those voters that rank him or her among their top x positions). Finally,
it outputs W . The algorithm is due to Skowron et al. [23] and achieves approximation ratio
of 1 − 2w(k)k . We mention that it is also a basis of a polynomial-time approximation scheme
for β-CC.
RangingCC. This is an extension of Algorithm P introduced in this paper. RangingCC computes
the committees using Algorithm P for threshold values x between 1 and |C|w(k)k and outputs
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the one with the highest β-CC score.
For β-Monroe, we consider the GreedyMonroe algorithm of Skowron et al. [23];4 again, we
use the same notation as in the description of multiwinner rules above (so we seek k winners for
election E = (C, V ) with m candidates and n voters):
GreedyMonroe. The algorithm starts by setting W to be the empty committee. Then it constructs
a Monroe assignment iteratively as follows (for simplicity, let us assume that k divides n).
At the beginning of each iteration, the algorithm finds a candidate c and nk voters, denoted by
V (c), that jointly maximize the Borda score of c in the election (C, V (c)). Then, the algorithm
adds c to W , assigns c to each voter in V (c), and removes the voters in V (c) from further
considerations. The algorithm guarantees an approximation ratio of 1− k−12(m−1) − Hkk , where
Hk = 1 +
1
2 + · · ·+ 1k is the k’th harmonic number.
C Results for Approximation Algorithms
The histograms for the approximation algorithms are presented in Figure 5 (together with the re-
peated histograms for β-CC and β-Monroe) and their variances for the number of winners per
quadrant are in Table 2.
Approximation Algorithms for β-CC. The results of the approximation algorithms for β-CC
are rather varied, but even a quick glance shows that RangingCC seems to be the closest to the
original β-CC rule. While we provide explanation as to why the other two algorithms are not doing
well, the performance of RangingCC came as a surprise to us and we still do not have a very good
explanation for its behavior.
To understand the behavior of GreedyCC, it suffices to recall that—by definition—in the first
iteration the algorithm chooses the Borda winner. In our elections, the Borda winner is always
located very close to the center, so the histograms for GreedyCC show a spike there. Then, due
to the nature of the Chamberlin–Courant rule (as described in the main body of the paper), the
algorithm selects candidates that are not too close to this first winner. This explains the patterns that
we see for all our distributions. These patters are far more visible for GreedyCC than for β-CC, in
4In the paper of Skowron et al., it is denoted as Algorithm A.
rule square disc Gauss. 4 Gauss.
GreedyCC 1.019 1.083 1.106 1.132
Algorithm P 2.551 2.453 2.418 2.381
RangingCC 0.907 0.944 1.015 0.959
GreedyMonroe 0.848 0.926 0.978 0.877
Table 2: Variance of the number of winners in each quadrant.
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Figure 6: Histograms and sample elections for several voting rules, for the case where the candidates
and voters are distributed uniformly on two overlapping squares.
particular, because the first iteration chooses a candidate from almost the same location irrespective
of the actual distribution of the points. GreedyCC achieves good results for the variance for the
number of winners per quadrant.
The behavior of Algorithm P can be explained similarly to that of GreedyCC, but by an analogy
to the Bloc rule. Algorithm P considers candidates ranked at the top x positions, where x is a
prespecified threshold value (recall the description of the algorithm). In effect, the first iteration is
almost the same as in Bloc, except that Bloc chooses a candidate ranked most frequently among the
top k positions and Algorithm P considers the top x positions. In the second iteration, Algorithm P
chooses a candidate that is ranked among the top-x positions by many voters who are far from the
candidate chosen in the first iteration. Such a candidate is likely to also be included in the Bloc
committee (again, taking into account the fact that both rules consider slightly different numbers
of top candidates). We believe that similar effect lasts for a few iterations and is sufficient to create
those patterns in the histograms of Algorithm P which resemble Bloc. However, in further iterations
Algorithm P starts behaving differently than Bloc and, for example, chooses candidates from the
center (especially for the Gaussian and uniform disc distributions). Unfortunately, Algorithm P has
poor variance of the number of winners per quadrant (on the order of 2.4-2.5) and, indeed, visual
inspection of its results shows that they are not satisfactory. Thus we believe that it should not
be used (even though, in most settings, its guaranteed approximation ratio is better than that of
GreedyCC).
Finally, RangingCC achieves nearly the same histograms as β-CC and has very good results for
the variances for the number of winners per quadrant (but still slightly higher than β-CC). Since
RangingCC winners can be computed quite efficiently, it appears to be the best choice among the
three algorithms we have tested (in practice, one might also try the clustering technique of [13].
Nonetheless, we are quite baffled with the performance of RangingCC and do not really have con-
vincing explanations for its superiority against its component algorithms (various incarnations of
Algorithm P).
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GreedyMonroe. It appears that GreedyMonroe is a very good approximation algorithm for β-
Monroe. The histograms we obtained for it are very similar to those for β-Monroe and the variance
for the number of winners per quadrant is low (if a bit higher than for β-Monroe). In fact, Greedy-
Monroe’s histograms appear to be a bit more similar to the underlying distributions of candidates
and voters than those of β-Monroe, which by our criteria makes it a slightly better rule for par-
liamentary elections than the latter. Indeed, this also shows in the results of Elkind et al. [7], who
prove that GreedyMonroe satisfies the solid coalitions property—a property desirable for propor-
tional representation5—and that β-Monroe does not. Interestingly, while Elkind at al. [7] did not
insist strongly on this property, our three rules with histograms most similar to the underlying dis-
tributions (STV, SNTV, and GreedyMonroe) do satisfy it.
D Overlapping Squares Distribution
So far, our results for β-Monroe and β-CC were quite similar. To show that the rules are, indeed,
different, we have performed a quick experiment for a setting where the distributions of the ideal
points of candidates and voters are not the same:
Overlapping Squares. The ideal points of the candidates are distributed uniformly on the [−3, 1]×
[−3, 1] square, whereas the ideal points of the voters are distributed uniformly on the [−1, 3]×
[−1, 3] square.
Naturally, we should not expect any society to really follow such a distribution and we use it only
as a test case.
It turns out that STV, SNTV, β-CC, β-Monroe, RangingCC, and GreedyMonroe can be par-
titioned into two groups. STV, β-Monroe and GreedyMonroe aim for proportional representation
and, thus, their histograms put more emphasis on the candidates near the (1, 1)-corner. β-Monroe
also puts some emphasis on the (−1,−1) corner, while GreedyMonroe and STV do it only to a very
minor extent. On the other hand, SNTV, β-CC, and RangingCC are more geared towards covering
the intersection of the supports of the distributions of candidates and voters. We view this as further
evidence that these rules (or, rather, only β-CC and RangingCC, since we already argued against
SNTV) are well-suited for portfolio/movie selection tasks.
As to the three other rules, HarmonicBorda, k-Borda, and Bloc, note that they concentrate on
a support that is strictly smaller than the intersection of the two distributions, and tilted towards
the center of the voters’ distribution. This confirms the tendency of these rules to be detrimental to
extreme candidates.
E Integer Linear Program for HarmonicBorda
In this section we describe the integer linear program that we have used for computing Harmon-
icBorda.
5Formally, the property says the following: if we have an election with n voters, we want to choose a committee of
size k, and there is a candidate c that is ranked on the first place by at least n
k
voters, then this candidate shall be included
in the winning committee.
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Let E = (C, V ) be an input election with m candidates and n voters. We are interested in a
winning committee S of size k. We define the following binary variables. For j ∈ [m], we define
xj , with the intent that xj = 1 if and only if cj ∈ S. For i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], ` ∈ [k], we define y`i,j ,
with the intent that y`i,j = 1 if and only if the jth-ranked candidate of voter vi is chosen as her l-th
best committee member. We have the following optimization goal:
max
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[m]
∑
`∈[k]
1
`
· βm(j) · y`i,j ;
and we include the following constraints:
1. The committee includes exactly k candidates:∑
j∈[m]
xj = k.
2. For a given voter and position j, the candidate on position j can be `-th best committee
member for this voter for at most one value of `. Formally, for each i ∈ [n] and for each
j ∈ [m], we have the constraint: ∑
`∈[k]
y`i,j ≤ 1;
3. For a given voter, there is exactly one candidate that this voter ranks as `-th best in the com-
mittee. Formally, for each i ∈ [n] and for each ` ∈ [k], we have the constraint:∑
j∈[m]
y`i,j = 1;
4. A candidate cannot be the `-th best committee member for a given voter if this candidate is
not even a committee member. Formally, for each i ∈ [n], for each j ∈ [m], and for each
` ∈ [k], we have the constraint:
y`i,j ≤ xt;
where ct is the j-th ranked candidate of voter vi.
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